Ten Years After the Warnock Report: Is the Human Neo-Conceptus a Person? by Sutton, Agneta
The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 62 | Number 2 Article 10
May 1995
Ten Years After the Warnock Report: Is the Human
Neo-Conceptus a Person?
Agneta Sutton
Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Sutton, Agneta (1995) "Ten Years After the Warnock Report: Is the Human Neo-Conceptus a Person?," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 62:
No. 2, Article 10.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol62/iss2/10
Ten Years After the Warnock Report: 
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by 
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The author is a Research Fellow, The Centre for Bioethics and Public Policy, 
London, Eng/and This originally appeared in Medicina e Morale. 
The 1984 Warnock Report, produced by the Committee of Inquiry into 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology, set up by the British Government, has 
been a trendsetter in the matter of legislation regulating embryo research. The 
l4-day limit on embryo research recommended by the Committee has been 
adopted not only in Great Britain but in a number of countries in Europe. Yet, the 
Committee openly declared that this time limit was an arbitrary compromise 
adopted "in order to allay public anxiety" (WR, 65) and allow scientists as much 
time for research on the human embryo as publicly acceptable. 
Admitting that embryonic life begins at fertilisation the Committee wrote: 
Once fertilisation has occurred the subsequent developmental processes follow one 
another in a systematic order. leading in turn through cleavage, to the morula the 
blastocyst. development of the embryonic disc. and then to identifiable features within 
the embryonic disc such as the primitive streak. neural folds and neural tube (WR. 59). 
Once the process has begun, there is no particular part of the developmental process that 
is more important than another: all are part of a continuous process, and unless each 
stage takes place normally, at the correct time and in the correct sequence, further 
development will cease (WR. 65). 
While it declined from explicity answering the question of when the embryo 
becomes a person, it is clear that the Committee did not hold that personal human 
life begins when embryonic human life begins. To kill a person - or at least an 
innocent person - would be murder, and the majority of the Committee did not 
consider embryocide to be murder but recommended that research involving 
human embryos should continue (WR, 64). 
Catholic and Anglican Reactions 
Defending the sanctity of human life from the time of conception (fetilization), 
the Catholic Bishops of Great Britain were among those who took issue with the 
Warnock proposals (The Catholic Bishops' Joint Committee on Bio-ethical 
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Issues, 1983 and, also, 1984). In their response to the consultation document 
preceeding the Warnock Report they argued that the 14-day limit on embryo 
research was arbitrary and scientifically unsound. All the evidence, they said, 
indicates a developmental continuity from the time of fertilization onwards and 
points to the conclusion that from moment onwards there is a new human life. 
By contrast, the Board of Social Responsibility, a mouthpiece of The Church 
of England, declared that it was consistent with Anglican thinking to hold that 
"while a fertilized ovum should be treated with respect, its life is not so sacrosanct 
that it should be accorded the same status we afford to human beings" (BSR 
1984. 8). In a subsequent document it became evident, however, that Anglicans 
were divided on this fundamental issue. Some were inclined to accept the 
Catholic view that human life begins at conception; others felt that the early 
embryo was not yet a human being - and even less a person (BSR 1985). 
The "Pre-embryo" 
In an attempt to provide some scientific justification for choosing the 14-day 
limit for embryo research, the Warnock Committee described the primitive 
streak as marking "the beginning of the individual development of the embryo" 
(WR, 66 - the italics are provided by the present author). This statement bears 
the hallmark of the embryologist on the Committee, Dr. Ann McLaren, who, 
with a number of other scientists and philosophers, holds that individual human 
life only begins at about the time ofthe formation of the primitive streak and that 
the early product of conception is not the same individual being as the 
subsequent fetus and infant. 
In order to drive a conceptual wedge between the early product of conception 
and the post-fortnight embryo, a new word, "pre-embryo", was coined and its 
usage advocated almost simultaneously in 1986 in three different publications: 
Dr. Penelope Leach's explanatory note attached to The First Report of the 
Voluntary Licensing Authority for Human in vitro Fertilisation and Embryology; 
secondly, a paper, greatly influenced by the thinking of Professor Clifford 
Grobstein, entitled "Ethical Consideration of the New Reproductive 
Technology" by the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society; and 
thirdly, Dr. Anne McLaren's paper "Prelude on Embryogenesis" delivered the 
previous year to the Ciba Foundation Symposium on embryo research. 
Is the Neo-conceptus an Individual Organism? 
Several arguments were advanced in these publications for the view that the 
neo-conceptus is not an individual organism and that there is a discontinuity in 
the development from a one-cell entity, a zygote, to a multi-cellular organism of 
some 14 days after fertilization . 
Dr. Leach claimed that fertilization starts cell-division only - not individual 
life (Leach 1986, 39). But her argument, based on the possibility of artificially 
inducing cell-division in the unfertilized oocyte, is beside the point. The fact that 
artificially induced cell-division has failed to produce live offspring in mammals 
(Edwards 1980, 643-645) proves that fertilization is a sine qua non of organic 
development orientated towards the formation of an organism capable of any life 
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at all outside the womb. A mammalian oocyte with solely maternal 
chromosomes is incapable of sustaining normal embryogensis - as is also a 
denucleated oocyte injected with chromosomes derived solely from spermatozoa 
(Suarez \990, 620-629). In other words, normal embryogenesis requires the 
fusion of gametes of both maternal and paternal origin - i.e., fertilization. 
Moreover, when fertilization does start a process of cell-division which 
successfully leads to the development of a fetus, it is obvious that the individual 
organic life of that fetus was initiated precisely by this process of fertilization . 
When Dr. Leach calls the early product of conception a "cluster of cells" and "a 
precursor of the embryo,just as the separate sperm and egg were its precursors", 
she is clearly wrong (Leach 1986, 39). Unlike the products of conception, no 
spermatozoon or oocyte is by itself capable of developing into a fetus . 
When fertilization has taken place there is a new entity, a zygote, whose 
intrinsic powers and potentials are distinctly different in kind from those of the 
gametes taken separately - and different in kind also from the powers and 
potentials of any entity arising from cell-division started in an unfertilized oocyte. 
Fertilization is a necessary condition of goal-directed development towards the 
formation of a fetus and the development of an infant. Furthermore, it could be 
argued that this goal-directed development begins as soon as the spermatozoon 
has penetrated the oocyte, since its entry into the oocyte immediately initiates 
certain metabolic and secretory activities, the first important function of which is 
to prevent other spermatozoa from entering. 
The second argument advanced by Dr. Leach for not regarding the neo-
conceptus as an individual organism is that cell-division or cleavage does not 
always result in an embryo: things can go wrong. She mentions three types of 
failure: the product of conception may fail to implant; or, even if it does embed 
itself in the lining of the uterus, it might turn into a "blighted ovum", or, on the 
worst scenario, it might turn into a hydatidiform mole (Leach 1986, 39-40). 
Agai n her argument misses the target. She fails to take account of the 
fundamental distinction between a developmental failure due to environmental 
conditions and a failure due to conditions inherent in the conceptus itself. Failure 
to develop normally due to adverse intra-uterine conditions proves nothing about 
the nature of nascent human life and its development - except that it cannot 
survive under certain conditions. Such failures are accidents; they are caused by 
external conditions rather than by the intrinsic nature of the victims. 
If, on the other hand, development fails to take place because the entity lacks 
the inherent capacity to develop normally, it is inappropriate even to speak of a 
proper product of conception. And, because the nature and potentials of the 
entity are radically different from those of normal products of conception, the 
developmental failure of such an entity - be it a failure to implant, a failure 
resulting in a "blighted ovum" or a mishap such as the development of a 
hydatidiform mole - can tell us nothing about the nature and development of 
normal products of conception. 
Hydatidiform moles deserve special comment, however. There are two types: 
complete moles consisting of chorionic tissue only; and partial ones containing 
both fetal and chorionic tossue. A complete mole deriving from an oocyte which 
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has lost its nucleus but has been penetrated by two spermatozoa, or by a 
spermatozoon which has duplicated itself, is clearly not a proper product of 
conception, since it lacks a maternal chromosomal complement (Suarez 1990, 
629-630). A partial mole may develop when an oocyte - with no loss offemale 
nucleus - has been penetrated by more than one spermatozoon, or when an 
oocyte has been penetrated by a faulty spermatozoon, which due to an accident at 
gametogenesis possesses double or triple sets of chromosomes. Entities with such 
odd paternal chromosomal make-ups also lack the inherent capacity for normal 
embryogenesis, and so cannot either be regarded as proper products of 
conception. Their development, therefore, proves nothing about normal 
embryogensis. 
All three papers spoken of above contain arguments turning on the totipotency 
or lack of differentiation of the early cells. The one advanced by Dr. Leach is 
based on the view that the cells for a number of days after fertilization remain 
undifferentiated and are capable of developing into either fetal or so-called 
"extra-embryonic" tissue such as the placenta (Leach 1986, 39). Dr. McLaren 
speaks of totipotency rather than lack of differentiation, because, as she points 
out, in the mouse embryo - and, hence probably in the human embryo who 
closely resembles it - at the 16-cell stage, some four days after fertilization when 
the blastocyst has formed, the cells have already differentiated into two quite 
different types of cell (McLaren 1986, 9-10). The American Fertility Society'S 
argument is phrased in terms of the claim that the cells produced after the first 
cleavage divisions possess full developmental potential (American Fertility 
Society 1986, 26S). All the texts suggest that the observations referred to show 
that the neo-conceptus is destined to become not one individual or entity but two 
distinct types of entity, namely an embryo proper and "extra-embryonic" tissue. 
The American Fertility Society - like Norman Ford a few years later (Ford 
1988, 125, 137-139) - even goes so far as to suggest that the early cells after the 
first cleavages should be regarded as separate individual organisms (American 
Fertility Society 1986, 26S). 
However, the fact that the cells of the neo-conceptus are not yet differentiated, 
or that their developmental orientations are not yet fixed, does not prove that the 
entity is not an individual organism. Conversely, the fact that the cells at the 
blastocyst stage are differentiated into two types - some of them being 
programmed to become part of the fetus and others to become tissue supporting 
or nourishing it - shows both the functional unity and the common overall 
purpose of the process leading to this differentiation and the organic wholeness of 
the subsequent "fetus-placenta-unit" (for this last term, see Serra 1988, 54). 
Unless the cells from the start were cleaving according to a single programme in 
synchronized order, it would be pure chance that they came to form a fetus with a 
placenta; and it would be pure chance that normal products of conception follow 
the same pattern of development from zygote to "fetus-placenta-unit". The 
placenta and other so-called "extra-embryonic" tissues are, therefore, to be 
regarded as fetal organs (Daly 1987, 11). The "fetus-placenta-unit" is one 
organism. 
Furthermore, the fact that the placenta and other membranes are lost at birth 
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does not disprove the organic wholeness of the "fetus-placenta-unit", i.e., the 
unborn child. Rather, this loss is comparable to the child's loss of its milk-teeth 
later in life, a loss which certainly does not prove that his first teeth were not a 
proper part of him (Sutton 1990, 108). 
What decides whether the neo-conceptus is an individual organism is whether 
there is a common overall plan and purpose in the early cell-division. And in 
those cases where cell-division in the early product of conception leads to an ever 
increasing differentiation resulting in a "fetus-placenta-unit", there is clearly what 
Angelo Serra has called a "rigorous unity in a gradually differentiated totality" 
(Serra 1988, 40). There is an over-all purpose. 
Moreover, contrary to what the American Fertility Society suggests 
(American Fertility Society 1986, 27S), the fact that the trophoblast cells (the 
precursors of the placenta and other supportive fetal organs) are formed before 
the cells differentiating themselves into the precursors of the fetus is further proof 
of the "rigorous unity in the gradually differentiated totality". If the pace of the 
development of certain supportive organs is faster than that of other parts of the 
organism which they have to sustain, this is surely to ensure the necessary 
life-support for the further development of these parts. It is for the good of the 
organism as a whole. 
Equally unconvincing is Dr. McLaren's argument that our tracing of the 
continuity of human corporal life cannot go back beyond the stage, on about the 
16th day, when there is a spatially defined entity with spatially defined points, 
from which we can trace the different parts of the human body (McLaren 1986, 
12). The fact that at the 16-day stage it becomes discernible which parts of the 
organism will develop into head, arms and legs does not prove that the conceptus 
suddenly becomes an individual organism at this stage. That we can trace the 
morphological development of what becomes the fetus back to this point only (if 
true), does not prove that the entity preceding the 16-day embryo is not one and 
the same organism as the entity half-way to becoming a fully formed fetus . What 
matters is the organic unity of the entity. The 16th-day stage is just one of the 
many stages in the continuous goal-directed process of increased differentiation 
leading to the formation of the "fetus-placenta-unit". 
The final and oft repeated argument for not regarding the neo-conceptus as an 
individual organism is the fact of monozygotic twinning, which shows, so it is 
argued, that individual human life cannot begin before that stage is reached at 
which it is no longer possible for the product of conception to twin (Leach 1986, 
40; McLaren 1986, II; American Fertility Society 1986, 27S; Ford 1988, 135). 
Regardless of the time-limit for twinning, the argument is based on the dubious 
assumption that all embryos have an innate tendency - or at least ability - to 
twin. What little we know about monozygotic twinning indicates the very 
opposite. The incidence of monozygotic twinning, the same in all human 
populations, is a mere 0.36% oflive births, indicating that the tendency to twin is 
genetically determined and peculiar to a very small percentage of embryos 
(McLean 1991, 65). And if monozygotic twinning is genetically determined, it 
provides no objection to regarding the vast majority of embryos as individual 
human beings from fertilization. Moreover, if it is genetically determined, when 
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such twinning does occur, it does so because the initial product of conception 
contains a gene programming that there be two, not one, individuals. In a sense, 
then, in this situation there are two individual presences already from the start. 
If, however, monozygotic twinning is not genetically determined, then it must 
be understood as a form of asexual reproduction, whereby the conceptus sheds a 
part of itself (possibly a half), which in turn becomes a new individual organism. 
Even if this were the case, there is no problem about individuality. The original 
organism would continue its existence, while the daughter embryo would begin 
life at separation - a new individual life. In short, monozygotic twinning does 
not disprove the individuality or nascent human life but is perfectly compatible 
with the view that all human life is, and remains, continuous individual life from 
the time it begins. 
It has been argued, then, that individual human life begins at fertilization, 
except possibly in the case of monozygotic twins (when one twin may have 
developed as an off-shoot from the other). However, no account has been taken 
of the fact that fertilization itself is a process taking time. Some hold that there is 
no new organism (as distinct from a spermatozoon and an oocyte) until the 
genetic material of the paternal gamete has fused with that of the maternal one to 
form a new genome composed of 23 pairs of chromosomes so arranged that one 
chromosome in each pair is inherited from the mother and the other from the 
father. It could be maintained, however, that once the process of fertilization has 
been initiated by the penetration of the zona pellucida (surrounding the oocyte) 
by a spermatozoon, and the zona reacts preventing any further spermatozoon 
penetration, the two gametes work in unison as a functional whole seeking to 
maintain its own integrity and, also, developing in accordance with a single 
overall plan towards the formation of the zygote - an entity with the potential to 
develop into a mature human being. It might be argued, then, that human life 
really begins when the zona reacts to sperm penetration (cf. Tonti-Filippini 
1992). 
Whether, the last point is accepted or not, it would seem reasonable to 
conclude that once the zygote has been formed, there is a new organism, different 
from the two gametes taken separately, but the same as the fetus, the child and the 
adult into whom it develops. For there is no discontinuity in the process of 
embryogenesis from the zygote stage to the fetal stage and beyond. No substantial 
changes take place after fertilization . The neo-conceptus, i.e. zygote and the entity 
after the first cleavages, is the same individual organism as the adult into whom it 
later develops. 
Human Beings and Human Persons 
The question that poses itself now is the following: if we accept that the life of a 
human being beings at fertilization and is continuous from then onwards until the 
individual's death, should we also accept that the life ofthe human person begins 
at fertilization? Do the terms "human person" and "human being" refer to the 
same creatures? Some philosophers have argued that they do not. The trendsetter 
among these philosophers was Michael Tooley. In a paper entitled "A Defense of 
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Abortion and Infanticide", published in Philosophy and Public Affairs in 1972, 
Tooley argued that because the embryo, the fetus and also the infant lack 
consciousness and other intellectual capacities typical of adult persons, they do 
not deserve to be called persons (Tooley 1972, 37-65). 
On Tooley's line of reasoning, the term "human being" is a purely biological 
term referring to members of the species Homo sapiens, whereas the term 
"person" is a philosophical and theological term referring to creatures with 
certain intellectual capacities such as self-consciousness and rationality. It 
follows, of course, on this view that not all creatures possessing intellectual 
capacities need be human and, conversely, that not all human beings are persons. 
Peter Singer, Helga Kuhse and Diane Wells, embracing Tooley's account of 
personhood, argue that neither embryos, fetuses nor infants, nor those who are 
severely brain damaged or senile are persons (Kuhse and Singer 1985, 120-122, 
132-133; SInger and Wells 1984, 90-91). According to Singer and his co-
authors, to call these human beings persons and by virtue of the humanity ascribe 
the same rights to them as to hale and sane human adults is to express "specism", 
a prejudice as regrettable as racism. 
Tooley's and Singer's understanding of personhood can, however, be refuted 
by showing that what matters in regard to the notion of personhood is not present 
consciousness or presently exercisable intellectual abilities but a certain kind of 
nature, a "rational nature". 
I may not be exercising rational abilities while sleeping. Nor may I even be 
capable of doing so when sleeping. Yet, that would not temporarily make me a 
non-person. That I am capable of exercising such abilities when awake, shows 
that I am a person. The situation is both different and similar in the case of young 
children. They are not yet capable of exercising sophisticated intellectual abilities 
even when awake. But they possess an inherent capacity to develop intellectual 
abilities typical of adult persons. Provided all goes well, they will possess the 
intellectual abilities in question at some stage in life. And, as their lives are 
continuous, they remain the same individual beings from the time of conception 
until they die. If they are persons at some stages in their lives, then, surely they are 
persons at all stages of their lives. 
In the words of Benedict Ashley and Kevin O'Rourke, the definition of 
personhood ought not to be merely synchronic but should be diachronic (Ashley 
and O'Rourke 1989, 209). The definition of personhood may begin with a 
reference to those intellectual capacities typical of adult human persons, but it 
must include the entire biography of the individual human being or organism 
possessing these intellectual abilities. (ibid). 
Developing this understanding, Ashley and O'Rourke distinguish between 
passive and active potentials. The potential of clay to becomes a pot at the hands 
of the artisan is described as a passive potential or capacity. On the basis of this 
distinction, they argue that a human embryo has an active potential or capacity to 
develop into a mature human person with the intellectual abilities typical of 
human persons, whereas, for example, a cat embryo has an active capacity to 
develop the characteristics of a cat (Ashley and O'Rourke 1989,210). 
Differently expressed, the adult's presently exercisable intellectual abilities 
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must have originated from an initial capacity to develop those abilities (Sutton 
1990,114). A being possessing abilities associated with rationality must always 
have possessed a nature inherent in which was an original active capacity to 
develop such abilities. This kind of nature might be described as a rational nature. 
According to this reasoning, then, the human neo-conceptus possesses already a 
rational nature, the same rational nature as the adult possessing manifestable 
rational capacities. And hence, it seems reasonable to regard it as a person and to 
hold that the terms "human being" and "human person" refer to the same kind of 
creatures. 
Where this kind of argument might seem to fail, however, is in the case of those 
people who, because they suffer from conditions such as Down syndrome or the 
fragile X-chromosome condition, never quite do develop what we call typical 
adult rational abilities. But to meet this argument - and the suggestion that they 
are not persons - it suffices to say that rationality is not the only human quality 
bearing witness to our personhood. There are also typically human emotions, 
sensibilities, affections and desires. The emotive, affective and volitive side of 
man must not be forgotten; man is not distinguished by rationality alone. And 
mentally handicapped people do express typically human emotions, sensibilities, 
affections and desires, and do so to various degrees - as do the intellectually hale 
and fit. 
The Boethian and Thomist Understanding of Personhood 
It is interesting to note that this understanding of personhood is in keeping with 
the Boethian definition of a person as an individual being with a rational nature 
- naturae rationalis individua substantia (Boethius, Liber de Persona et Duabis 
Naturis, cc.2,3) and also, that Thomas Aquinas accepted the Boethian definition 
of a person. This is interesting because it might be suggested that, if Thomas 
Aquinas had had a more accurate understanding of embryogenesis, he might not 
have believed in delayed animation but might have arrived at the conclusion that 
the rational soul is infused at conception and that the neo-conceptus is a human 
person - not just a living organism preparing to become a person. However, it is 
well known that Aquinas believed in delayed animation, because he held that a 
human rational soul could not be present in the human body until it was 
sufficiently formed to possess the organs through which such a soul could 
actualize its proper powers (Aquinas, De Anima X, ad 2; Summa contra Gentiles, 
11,86,40). 
And contrary to what is being suggested above, there are modern philosophers 
who hold that even in the light of modern knowledge, Aquinas would not have 
accepted a theory of immediate animation. The most prominent of these 
philosophers may be Joseph Donceel, SJ, who has argued that, on Aquina's 
reasoning, the human body would not be ready to receive the rational soul until 
the central nervous system is developed (Donceel 1970, 76-105). 
Let us consider this argument. If the possession of a central nervous system is a 
necessary and sufficient condition of the possession of a rational soul, it follows 
that it is not necessary for a human being actually to exercise rational abilities in 
order to be a person with a rational soul. Both the fetus and the infant would be 
70 Linacre Quarterly 
persons on this understanding, though the embryo or neo-conceptus would not. 
This is because both the fetus and the infant possess a central nervous system, and 
so fulfill the requirement ofhylomorphism; that is to say, their bodies are thought 
to be vehicles through which the rational souls might be expressed; their bodies 
are thoguht to complement the soul. 
But is the possession of a central nervous system really a sine qua non of the 
sort of complementarity that may be necessary? To focus on this point, the fetus is 
only potentially capable of exercising rational powers; it is no more capable of 
doing so tahn the neo-conceptus. If the rational soul requires a body with the 
organs through which it may express itself, would it not be sounder to suggest that 
the rational soul is infused only at a time when the soul actually begins to 
actualize its powers through these organs? Why should it lie dormant in the 
organism from the fetal stage until the toddler stage when the child begins to 
express rational abilities? 
Conversely, if it is admitted that the fetus's potential to express rational abilities 
is an active capacity, one that is inherent in such a way that it will be actualized in 
the future (provided the development of the fetus is not hampered by illness, 
accident or intentional destruction), must it not also be admitted that this active 
potential is inherent already in the neo-conceptus or from the zygote stage 
onwards? If the rational soul may be present in the human organism without 
being in a position to express itself when there is a central nervous system, why 
may it not also be present before that in a human organism with the kind of tissues 
and cells preceeding the formation of a central nervous system? 
Is it not true that once one admits that the rational soul may be present in the 
body even if it is not (yet) in a position to express itself, one must also admit that 
the proper substrate of the soul cannot be any particular organ but must be the 
living human organism itself insofar as it possesses the inherent active potential 
one day to develop and express rational (and, also, typically human emotive, 
affective, volititive as well as spiritual) characteristics? And the human organism, 
the same living human organism, is present from the zygote stage to the fetal stage 
and onwards? 
We seem yet again to arrive at the conclusion that unless an organism from the 
beginning possesses an active power to develop certain intellectual abilities, it will 
never do so and, conversely, that any organism who has the active potential to 
develop abilities of other features characteristic of mature human beings is 
already a human being with a rational - or spiritual soul - and nature. 
Indeed, if it is accepted that from conception onwards, human life is a 
continuous process involving no substantial but only accidental changes, it 
follows logically on a non-dualist understanding of personhood that the human 
soul must be infused at conception. Conversely, as Diane Nutwell Irving has 
pointed out, any theory about the beginnings of human personal life which is 
based on some biological marker or event marks a substantial change. Aquinas 
would never have accepted a dualist theory; nor would he have accepted a theory 
that did not accord with observable facts. And the assumption that the embryo at 
some stage undergoes a substantial change is contradicted by the facts . 
Everything we know about embryogenesis indicates that there is continuous 
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individual life from the time of conception, and so that the nature of the organism 
remains the same from then onwards. 
Of course, we know that Aquinas believed in a hierarchy of souls rising from 
the vegetative to the sensitive and to the rational soul in such a way that a higher 
soul possesses the powers of any lower soul; and that, following Aristotle, he also 
believed that the biological development of nascent human life was marked by a 
succession of substantial changes, at each of which it aquired a new and higher 
soul starting with the vegetative and ending with the rational soul (Summa 
Theologiae, 1, 118, 2 ad 2). But as Stephen Heany has shown, Aquinas also 
believed that until the conceptus was sufficiently developed to embody a rational 
soul, the "life principle" guiding its development did not come from within itself 
but from the paternal sperm (Heany 1993, 51). And noting the absurdity of this 
theory in the light of modern embryology, Heany convincingly argues that, if 
Thomist non-dualist lines of reasoning are applied to the present understanding 
of the embryo's development, it follows that right from the time of conception the 
organizing life principle of the human organism must be the rational soul of the 
being itself (Heany 1993, 51-68). 
Heany begins his argument by showing that, on a Thomist account, it would 
be impossible for a lower soul to guide the development of the organism towards 
the aquisition of a higher and more powerful soul, since the effect cannot be 
greater than the cause (Heany 1993, 48-50). Hence, a vegetative soul, 
corresponding to a non-sensitive and non-rational organism, would not suffice to 
bring about the organic structure required to express rational powers. The only 
kind soul or life principle capable of directing the embryogenic process towards 
the development of the kind of body capable of expressing rationality would be a 
rational soul. However, since Aquinas did not believe that the rational soul is 
present from the time of conception, he drew the conclusion that it is the father's 
rational soul, the powers of which are inherent in the sperm or semen, which 
direct the process of embryogenesis (Heany 1003,51). But this is unacceptable on 
a modern understanding. The fertilizing spermatozoon fuses with the oocyte and 
together they form the new genome, which at the biological level provides the 
information required for embryogenesis. The non-fertilizing spermatozooa and 
the rest of the semen are absorbed by the maternal body. Hence, on a 20th 
century Thomist understanding, the rational soul required for embryogenesis 
must inhere in the conceptus itself; there is no other possibility (Heany 1993,54). 
To conclude, in modern terms, at the level of molecular biology, the organic 
vehicle for expressing the organizing life principle of the neo-conceptus derives 
from the genome consisting of 23 pairs of chromosomes, one of each pair from 
the father, the other from the mother. At a philosophical level (or more precisely 
at the ontological level), on the other hand, if what distinguishes human beings 
from animals is their rational nature (complemented by certain affective, emotive 
and volitive characteristics), then their life principle is that inherent power which 
makes it possible for adult human beings to actually manifest rationality (and 
those other complementary characteristics mentioned). And this power we may 
call the rational and spiritual soul. Therefore, on a non-dualist understanding of 
the realtionship between body and soul, unless the developing human organism 
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undergoes a substantial change at some stage in its development from the time of 
conception, the rational soul must have been present from that time onwards as 
an active potential to develop those rational (and other) abilities by virtue of 
which we speak of human persons and distinguish human beings from animals. 
And so we may say that the soul of the human embryo is a goal-directed, 
self-directing dynamism and active capacity to develop into a mature human 
being. 
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